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A B S T R A C T
As nations face the need to decarbonise their energy supply, there is a risk that attention will be focused solely
on carbon and climate change, potentially at the expense of other environmental impacts. To explore the trade-offs
between climate changemitigation and other environmental impacts, this work focuses on electricity and considers
a number of scenarios up to 2070 in a UK context with different carbon reduction targets and electricity demand
to estimate the related life cycle environmental impacts. In total, 16 scenarios are discussed, incorporating fossil-
fuel technologies with and without carbon capture and storage, nuclear power and a range of renewable options.
A freely available model – Electricity Technologies Life Cycle Assessment (ETLCA) – developed by the authors has
been used for these purposes. The results suggest that decarbonisation of electricity supply to meet carbon targets
would lead to a reduction in the majority of the life cycle impacts by 2070. The exceptions to this are depletion of
elements which would increase by 4–145 times and health impacts from radiation which would increase two- to
four-fold if nuclear power were used. Ozone layer depletion would also go up in the short-term by between 2.5–3.7
times. If energy demand continued to grow, three other impacts would also increase while trying to meet the carbon
targets: human toxicity (two times), photochemical smog (12%) and terrestrial eco-toxicity (2.3 times). These findings
demonstrate the importance of considering a broader range of environmental impacts alongside climate change to
avoid decarbonising the economy at the expense of other environmental impacts.
Keywords: Climate change; Decarbonisation; Electricity; Environmental impacts; Life cycle assessment; Scenario
analysis
c⃝ 2015 The Authors. The Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is
an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. IntroductioneCarbon reduction targets have become a common element of
national policy around the globe. Currently they are disparate
in ambition, ranging from The Maldives’ target for carbon
neutrality by 2020 to China’s aim of reducing carbon intensity
(per unit GDP) rather than absolute emissions (Ecofys
and Climate Analytics, 2014). However, decarbonisation has
become a well-established goal and the energy sector has
been a popular focus owing to its contribution to greenhouse
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gas (GHG) emissions: in 2010, electricity and heat together
constituted the largest source of CO2 emissions globally at
41% of the total (IEA, 2012). Consequently, much debate and
scenario analysis has been devoted to ways in which energy
sector emissions might be reduced (see for, example, IEA
(2013b) and Pehnt (2006)).
The UK provides a good example of a nation with ambi-
tious carbon targets in need of an energy sector transforma-
ers. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. This is an open
ns.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
2 S U S TA I N A B L E P R O D U C T I O N A N D C O N S U M P T I O N 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 – 2 1Fig. 1 – Fuel mix for UK electricity generation from 2004–2011 (based on data from DECC (2013b)).tion. A 2050 carbon target has been set in law in the Climate
Change Act (2008) requiring the nation as a whole to reduce
GHG emissions by 80% relative to 1990. To meet this target, all
sectors will have to increase substantially their use of low-
carbon technologies. A number of studies have considered
how this could potentially be achieved through scenario anal-
ysis, particularly addressing electricity supply (Tyndall Cen-
tre, 2005; DECC, 2011a; Ekins et al., 2013): the electricity sector
is thought to have the greatest potential to reduce emissions
and to bear reductions that would otherwise be required of
sectors in which fossil fuels are harder to substitute (for ex-
ample, transport and heat). As shown in Fig. 1, 65%–85% of
electricity in the UK has been provided by fossil fuels in recent
years (DECC, 2013b), with nuclear providing 15%–20% and re-
newables 5%–10%; the balance (typically 1%–3%) is imported,
largely from France (DECC, 2013a).
However, while the focus remains on reducing GHG emis-
sions, there is a risk that climate change mitigation may be
carried out at the expense of other environmental impacts,
such as acidification, eutrophication, ozone layer depletion
and toxicity. It is therefore important that any such trade-offs
be identified early on, before irreversible decisions are made.
It is also essential that the impacts be considered on a life
cycle basis to avoid ‘leakage’ from one life cycle stage – or
a region – to another. Currently, global and national policies
related to climate change and energy focus solely on direct
carbon emissions, i.e. emissions at the point of energy gen-
eration. This omission of life cycle thinking in environmental
policy has been acknowledged by several authors in the de-
bate over consumer-oriented versus producer-oriented emis-
sions accounting (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a,b; Hertwich and
Peters, 2009; Davis and Caldeira, 2010; Davis et al., 2011; Skel-
ton et al., 2011). In short, while policy approaches such as
the Kyoto Protocol and its successors attempt to limit emis-
sions within geographical boundaries, a globalised market
compels us to consider imports and exports as well: with
a producer-oriented approach, a country can decrease its
national emissions by curtailing domestic industry and im-
porting more goods from abroad, in turn stimulating foreign
industrial emissions and resulting in a net zero global de-
crease. In many such cases, the reality is a net increase
in emissions because the exporting country has a more
environmentally-harmful energy system; this has been the
case for many developed countries, including the UK, which
have effectively exported emissions to China and other
emerging markets (Davis and Caldeira, 2010). The same
has been demonstrated for water consumption (Steen-Olsen
et al., 2012). Life cycle assessment-based approaches avoid
this problem by considering whole supply chains and ac-
counting for impacts at both the producer and consumer
sides.In light of the above, this work sets out to explore
the life cycle environmental implications of decarbonising
electricity supply using scenario analysis and considering
the time horizon up to 2070. In total, 16 scenarios are
considered, comprising 49 technology options, from fossil-
fuel with and without carbon capture and storage (CCS), to
nuclear to renewables. A freely available model – Electricity
Technologies Life Cycle Assessment (ETLCA) – developed by
the authors has been used for these purposes (Kouloumpis
et al., 2012). As an illustration of possible consequences for
other environmental impacts of electricity decarbonisation,
the analysis is carried out in the UK context but similar
findings would hold elsewhere. A life cycle approach is
applied throughout, using life cycle assessment (LCA) to
estimate the environmental impacts. As far as the authors
are aware, this is the first study of its kind for the UK
electricity sector combining a life cycle approach and scenario
analysis. Elsewhere, there have been a few such studies in the
electricity sector, notably for Germany (Pehnt, 2006), South
Africa (Heinrich et al., 2007) as well as Europe and Africa
(Viebahn et al., 2011).
The following section details the methodology developed
and applied in this work, including the description of
electricity technologies and scenarios. The results are
presented and discussed in Section 3 and conclusions are
drawn in Section 4, together with recommendations for
future work.
2. Methodology
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the methodology integral to the ETLCA
model involves the following steps:
1. choice and specification of electricity technologies, both
those used currently and those expected to be used in the
future;
2. definition of scenarios based on different carbon targets
and possible future electricity mixes;
3. estimation of direct carbon emissions for each scenario
and electricity mix to ensure that the defined carbon
targets are met;
4. estimation of life cycle environmental impacts for each
scenario based on the chosen electricity mixes;
5. comparison of scenarios in terms of environmental
impacts; and
6. identification of the trade-offs between carbon reductions
and other environmental impacts.
The process begins with the selection and characterisation
of technologies that are appropriate for a particular country
or region. The ETLCA model comprises 12 main technology
types, spanning fossil, nuclear and renewable options; each
type is split further into different size, capacity, design,
S U S TA I N A B L E P R O D U C T I O N A N D C O N S U M P T I O N 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 – 2 1 3Fig. 2 – Schematic representation of the ETLCA methodology.technology mix, etc. As mentioned earlier, there are 49
technology options to choose from, plus an electricity mix
for imports. This is followed by the definition of scenarios,
including the time horizon and reference years within that
period, electricity demand and carbon targets. Sub-scenarios
are then defined in detail by configuring the electricity mix for
the reference years for which the carbon targets are specified,
in this case 2020, 2035, 2050, and 2070; the related electricity
generation by each technology is calculated automatically
within the ETLCA model. The electricity output is then
used to calculate the direct annual carbon emissions for
each technology for each reference year, which are checked
against the carbon targets for these years. Sub-scenario
configuration is then repeated iteratively until the direct
emission compliance check is passed.
Thus, in terms of user input, ETLCA requires the user to
define scenarios (electricity consumption and direct carbon
emissions in each reference year) and to specify a technology
mix in each reference year for each sub-scenario. The
technology mix may then need to be amended until the
calculated carbon emissions comply with the target for that
year.
Following these steps, the environmental impacts are cal-
culated automatically for each scenario using the ETLCA
database. This contains LCA data for the following 12 en-
vironmental impacts, estimated following the CML 2001
methodology (Guinée et al., 2002): global warming poten-
tial, depletion of elements and fossil fuels, acidification,
eutrophication, freshwater, marine and terrestrial eco-
toxicity, human toxicity, ozone layer depletion, photochem-
ical smog and health impacts from radiation. The impacts
are calculated on both an annual and per-kilowatt-hour basis
for each reference year. The sub-scenarios can then be com-
pared for the environmental impacts over time using tables
and graphs which are automatically populated as the analy-
sis progresses. The model is dynamic as it allows the user to
make changes to the choice of technologies, scenario defini-
tions and electricity mixes at any point during the analysis,
with all the changes being reflected directly in the tables and
the graphs. In this way, it is possible to explore in a system-
atic way a large number of possibilities for future electricity
pathways and identify any trade-offs between mitigation of
climate change and other environmental impacts. Therefore,
the ETLCA model aids effective decision making by indicat-
ing how policy should be tailored to minimise environmental
impacts along supply chains while attempting tomeet carbon
targets.
It should be noted that the ETLCA provides LCA data for
technologies in a generic European context rather than a
site-specific one to enable its application in different regions
and countries. Site-specific considerations can be taken into
account by changing parameters such as electricity demandprofiles, technology mix as well as carbon constraints, all of
which are fully user-controllable.
The next section describes each step in more detail us-
ing the UK as an illustrative example, starting with the
description of electricity technologies and followed by the
definition of scenarios and their respective carbon targets and
electricity mixes. The results of the estimation of environ-
mental impacts, including the comparison of scenarios and
the trade-offs between the impacts, are discussed subse-
quently in Section 3.
2.1. Electricity technologies
A summary of the current UK generating fleet is given in
Table 1, with the specific technologies detailed in Table 2,
together with their contribution to the electricity mix from
present to 2070. As shown in Fig. 3, the whole life cycle of
technologies is considered, from extraction and processing
of fuels and raw materials, to construction and operation
of plants to generate electricity to their eventual decommis-
sioning. For most technologies, future developments and im-
provements have been taken into account, based on projec-
tions by various sources (see Table 2). For some technolo-
gies, the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ cases have been considered, refer-
ring to their potential future development: the former takes
an optimistic approach assuming high technology efficien-
cies and considerable technological development while the
‘worst’ case considers the opposite. This has implications for
the life cycle environmental impacts of technologies, so that
the ‘best’ case is denoted as ‘Min’, indicating low impacts and
the ‘worst’ case as ‘Max’, denoting high impacts. The poten-
tial of different technologies to contribute to future electric-
ity supply in the UK has also been taken into account when
defining the scenarios. This is discussed below in more detail
for each technology in turn.
2.1.1. Fossil fuels
As mentioned earlier, natural gas and coal still supply
up to 85% of UK’s electricity demand (DECC, 2013b). The
contribution from gas power has been growing since the mid-
1990s, peaking in 2010 at 41%. Owing to their low capital costs
and the fact that they are a proven technology, combined
cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) are the main source of electricity
from gas and are likely to remain a significant contributor to
UK electricity supply in future: since the beginning of 2009,
the government has given planning consent to 13.5 GW of
new CCGT capacity (DECC, 2013e). For these reasons, CCGT is
the main natural-gas technology considered in the scenarios,
with the non-CCGT (advanced open cycle gas turbine) playing
a negligible role (see Table 2). As indicated in the table,
the LCA data have been sourced from the NEEDS database
4 S U S TA I N A B L E P R O D U C T I O N A N D C O N S U M P T I O N 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 – 2 1Fig. 3 – The life cycle stages for different electricity technologies considered in the scenario analysis [Dashed lines indicate
optional stages, depending on the option considered.].Table 1 – Installed capacity and number of operational power plants in the UK (in May 2013 based on data from DECC
(2013a, 2014a)).
Type Installed capacity (GW) Number of installations
Coal 22.00 14
Natural gas 32.30 54
Oil 2.95 30
Nuclear 9.24 9
Wind 9.77 >207a
Hydro 1.97 82
Solar photovoltaics 1.71 402,286
Biomass/biogas 4.19 15
Otherb 6.60 ≥137a
Total 90.7 >402,708
aActual number of installations cannot be disambiguated fully using the available statistics for the time period.
bMainly comprising combined heat and power (various fuels) and pumped storage.
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Bauer et al. (2008). An equal split is assumed between the
‘best’ (Min) and ‘worst’ (Max) cases for future technology
development.
In addition to conventional gas, the UK is currently under-
going an intensive period of exploration for shale gas which
might potentially lead to a boom in indigenous production.
This could become significant in future gas supply. How-
ever, as LCA data for UK shale gas are still evolving (MacKay
and Stone, 2013; Cooper et al., 2014; Stamford and Azapagic,
2014a), shale gas is not considered in this work.
In contrast to natural gas, UK coal power has declined
greatly in the last two to three decades, going from 65% in
1990 down to 34% in 2011 (DECC, 2013b). The contribution of
coal will again decline markedly over the next few years as
a result of the EU Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD): a
total of 8.5 GW of coal plants have opted out of the LCPD and
will shut down permanently by the beginning of 2016 (Na-
tional Grid, 2010). In addition, the new Emissions Performance
Standard limits emissions from new plants to 450 g CO2/kWh
at the point of generation (DECC, 2011b), in effect making con-
struction of coal plants without CCS impossible as the un-
abated emissions of new plants are around 800 g CO2/kWh
(IEA, 2013a). Therefore, while the existing coal plants will still
be available in the short-term, their future potential is lim-
ited, particularly if the current carbon targets are to be met.
Consequently, in future scenarios the contribution of coal
power declines and the efficiency of the remaining plants im-
proves (to 45%) under the assumption that they are upgraded
by, for instance, installation of new steam turbines. A mix of
plant sizes is assumed (see Table 2) using LCA data from the
NEEDS database (NEEDS, 2010) based on technology specifica-
tions described in Bauer et al. (2008).
The contribution from oil power plants has been declining
over the years and has been below 2% since 1998. Since oil
plants are also affected by the LCPD, their contribution will
continue to decline in future. Therefore, oil is not considered
as part of future electricity mix in the scenario analysis.
2.1.2. Nuclear
At the time of writing, the UK had 16 operating reactors
totalling 10 GW but this is declining as they age and are
decommissioned; no reactors have been commissioned since
1995 and all but one will be retired by 2023 (World Nuclear
Association, 2013). The Government has been attempting
to encourage new nuclear build since 2008 (BERR, 2008),
culminating recently in its agreement with EDF Energy on a
strike price for the ‘contract for difference’ that will apply to
their forthcoming Hinkley Point C nuclear plant (DECC, 2013c):
this guarantees fixed, long-term income for new nuclear
plants. Nuclear power will also benefit indirectly from the
UK’s unilateral carbon price floor which tops up the price
of carbon traded through the European Union’s Emission
Trading Scheme (ETS). Rates for 2014–15 are £9.55/tonne CO2,
rising above £20/t by 2016 (HMRC, 2013).
Currently, up to 15.8 GW of new nuclear capacity has been
proposed by various utilities and consortia (World Nuclear
Association, 2013). The LCA data for nuclear power in the
scenarios are taken from Stamford and Azapagic (2012) and,
as described there, assume high burnup and once-through
cycle (Table 2), both of which are commensurate with current
policy and plant design.2.1.3. Carbon capture and storage
UK policy currently supports development of CCS via a
£1 billion commercialisation competition and coordinated
research and development programmes (DECC, 2013d).
Although the planned coal CCS demonstration plants are yet
to materialise, it is still anticipated that CCS will make a
considerable contribution to the UK energy mix (DECC, 2011a,
2012).
The introduction of coal and gas CCS in the scenarios
follows projections of the Department of Energy and Climate
Change which envisage 2020 to 2025 as the first deployment
time period (DECC, 2012). LCA data on CCS are taken from
the NEEDS database (NEEDS, 2010) based on technology
specifications described in Bauer et al. (2008). For coal CCS,
this begins with post-combustion capture technology as
current plants are converted, then moves to a mix of post-
combustion and oxy-fuel plants by 2035, as given in Table 2.
For natural gas, only post-combustion CCS is considered, as
this is the most likely technological solution for CCGTs.
2.1.4. Biomass
Use of biomass for energy in the UK includes landfill gas,
sewage sludge digestion, municipal waste combustion, ani-
mal/plant matter combustion and co-firing with fossil fuels.
In 2008, these technologies contributed 2.5% of total electric-
ity generation, rising to 4.2% (15,198 GWh) in 2012 (DECC,
2014a). Landfill gas has traditionally been the biggest contrib-
utor with 34% of the total in 2012, but plant biomass, such as
straw and energy crops, is beginning to overtake it. Projects
currently under construction or in planning could lead to an
approximate doubling of capacity, and this excludes proposed
conversions of existing coal plants to 100% biomass (DECC,
2013f). Therefore, it is likely that biomass generation will ex-
ceed 30,000 GWh/yr by 2020, which would equate to around
8% of the electricity mix. Growth beyond this time period is
currently quite speculative.
The LCA data for biomass are taken from the Ecoinvent
and NEEDS databases (Ecoinvent Centre, 2010; NEEDS, 2010).
As shown in Table 2, they describe combined heat and power
(CHP) units of varying size including combustion of waste,
sewage, biogas from waste and biogas from manure (all of
which are described by Jungbluth et al., 2007) as well as a
larger straw combustion plant described by Gärtner (2008).
Following the common approach in LCA, biogenic carbon is
not considered (ISO, 2013).
2.1.5. Wind
The installed capacity of wind power in the UK has been in-
creasing substantially owing to continued political support.
In 2008, 3.4 GW were operational, of which 83% was on-
shore (DECC, 2013a); by early 2014 this had grown to 10.5 GW,
of which 65% was onshore (RenewableUK, 2014). There is
currently 3.8 GW of offshore capacity under construction
or consented (RenewableUK, 2014) and an identified avail-
able capacity of around 40 GW by 2030 (The Crown Estate,
2014); if achieved, offshore wind alone would then constitute
25%–30% of the electricity mix (assuming 30% capacity fac-
tor). Meanwhile, onshore installations under construction or
consented total 6 GW (RenewableUK, 2014).
In total, therefore, around 20 GW may be online by
2020 (growing considerably thereafter) generating about
53,000 GWh per year. By 2050, the Government’s Carbon Plan
suggests a top estimate of 288,000 GWh/yr in its ‘Higher
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this provides 55% of electricity.
As shown in Table 2, the LCA data for wind power are
based on commercially available turbines with capacities of
1.65–5 MW. Onshore installations have an assumed capacity
factor of 30% – close to the UK 2008–2012 average of 26%
(DECC, 2013a) – while offshore increases from 30% to 50%
as technology allows the exploitation of stronger, more
consistent winds at higher altitudes and in deeper waters (UK
average over the period 2008–2012 = 32% DECC, 2013a).
2.1.6. Solar PV
In 2008, solar technology had received little support in the
UK and total installed capacity was just 22.5 MW; this
provided about 0.005% of electricity supply (DECC, 2013a).
However, the UK introduced a Feed-in Tariff (FiT) in April
2010 obliging large energy suppliers to make payments
to owners of small-scale (<5 MW) renewable installations,
predominantly PV, based on the total amount of electricity
produced (Energy Saving Trust, 2013). By the end of 2013
there were 497,935 installations totalling 2.65 GW (DECC,
2014a). The vast majority of this capacity comprises small-
scale, building-mounted installations: large-scale (>5 MW)
installations totalled only 300 MW at the time of writing.
Overall, despite its rapid growth, PV still makes a small
contribution to the electricity mix, with the above capacity
able to generate about 2100 GWh/yr (∼0.6% of current supply).
It has been estimated that 7–20 GW of PV capacity might
be online by 2020 (DECC, 2013f) – enough to provide around
5500–16,000 GWh/yr (∼1.5–4.3% of supply). It should be noted,
however, that National Grid expects a total PV capacity of over
10 GW to be technically unfeasible without greatly expanded
energy storage (National Grid, 2012).
LCA data for small-scale solar PV come from the authors’
previous work (Stamford and Azapagic, 2012, 2014b) and are
based on 3 kWp rooftop installations producing 750 kWh/kWp
per year and improvements in efficiency according to the IEA’s
solar PV roadmap (IEA, 2010). Large scale ground-mounted in-
stallations are also included (see Table 2) using data from the
NEEDS database (NEEDS, 2010) as described by Frankl et al.
(2006).
2.1.7. Marine
Marine power in the UK remains virtually unexploited,
despite considerable resources. In 2008, the total installed
capacity was just 0.5 MW, rising to 7 MW by the end of
2013 with annual generation of <5 GWh (DECC, 2014a).
However, these are early-stage, experimental devices; it has
been estimated that up to 200 MW might be installed by
2020, by which time the technology should be more mature
(RenewableUK, 2013). Ultimately, estimates suggest that the
total wave energy in UK waters is as high as 840,000 GWh/yr,
of which 50,000 GWh/yr might be exploitable with current
technology (RenewableUK, 2013): equivalent to ∼13% of
current electricity supply. Given the huge resource available
to the UK, marine power is likely to expand greatly in future.
Owing to technological immaturity, LCA data for large-
scale installations are currently lacking. Data in this analysis
are taken from the NEEDS database (NEEDS, 2010) and
describe a 7 MW bucket-type wave device as specified by
Sørensen and Naef (2008); see Table 2.2.1.8. Hydro
Hydropower output in the UK has been steady for at least
two decades, reflecting the fact that the best sites are already
thought to be exploited. Generation from run-of-river plants
in 2008 was 5155 GWh from 1.6 GW capacity, providing 1.3%
of electricity (DECC, 2013a). Annual generation correlates with
rainfall, but these figures do not change considerably year-on-
year. The UK has a greater capacity of pumped storage hydro
plants (2.7 GW) – which use electricity from the generation
mix to pump water uphill for later usage – and is likely
to require more in future as the capacity of intermittent
renewables increases. However, as pumped storage is an
energy storage rather than a generation technology, it is not
included in this study.
LCA data for hydropower (Table 2) are taken from the
Ecoinvent database (Ecoinvent Centre, 2010) and are described
in detail in Bauer and Bolliger (2007).
2.2. Scenarios
As with all scenario analyses, the intention here is to
illustrate possible pathways and futures for electricity supply
rather than to make forecasts or predictions. For these
purposes, four illustrative scenarios – A, B, C and D – are
considered, each with four sub-scenarios. They have been
developed considering the whole energy system in the UK,
based on the scenarios developed by the SPRIng project
(Azapagic et al., 2011). However, for the purposes of this
paper, the focus is on electricity. Unlike most other scenarios
which consider the period up to 2050, the scenarios developed
in this work extend the analysis up to 2070. Considering
periods beyond 2050 is important not only because of the long
timescales associated with climate change and sustainable
development but also because some of the technologies that
could help tackle climate change will have very long-term
effects, particularly nuclear and carbon capture and storage.
However, considering longer timescales is not without its
challenges, not the least because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to anticipate future technological developments.
The certainty of the underlying data, therefore, diminishes
as they are projected out into the future (see Fig. 6) as does
the robustness of the assessment. While direct emissions
scenarios may be sufficiently robust out to 2100 (as published
by the IPCC, 2014, for instance), life cycle assessment data are
likely not, making an earlier cut-off prudent. Nevertheless,
as discussed later in the paper, we have used current
knowledge and future projections from a range of sources
in an attempt to estimate potential impacts of different
electricity technologies up to 2070. To be consistent with the
carbon targets which refer to 2050, the discussion in the
paper also refers to this year as the main reference point but
also shows the implications up to 2070 based on the trends
established in the scenarios. The year 2008 is taken to be the
base year as its electricity mix is closest to the average mix in
recent years (see Fig. 1) and is therefore representative of the
current situation.
All scenarios considered here are driven by the need to
reduce carbon emissions as this is one of the main policy
drivers in the UK (DECC, 2011b,a). As summarised in Table 3
and Fig. 4, they assume different carbon reduction targets
from the electricity sector, ranging from 65% to 100%, as well
as different electricity consumption and technology mixes.
Scenarios B and C are based on GHG emissions trajectories
in line with the current UK targets, ultimately reaching 80%
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Fig. 4 – SPRIng scenarios for UK electricity up to 2070.Table 3 – Summary of scenarios and assumptions.
Scenario Description Ref.
year
Electricity
demand
(TWh)
Electricity
demand change
relative to 2008
(%)
Directa CO2
emissions
(Mt CO2)
CO2
reduction
relative to
1990b(%)
Base
year
Current electricity consumption and emissions 2008 372.16 – 199.94 6
A There is limited action to reduce carbon emissions.
2020 336.38 −11 176.12 17
2035 376.73 1 147.98 30
2050 407.86 9 74.64 65
2070 455.54 18 43.37 80
B
Overall carbon emissions are reduced broadly in line with UK
targets. Overall energy use is reduced but electricity
consumption increases moderately. The electricity sector is
fully decarbonised by 2050.
2020 352.34 −6 144.14 32
2035 383.94 3 21.56 90
2050 535.12 30 0.21 100
2070 483.68 23 0.11 100
C
Same as scenario B but electricity consumption increases
three-fold compared to 2008.
2020 409.74 9 138.16 35
2035 891.01 58 71.12 67
2050 1099.82 66 0.01 100
2070 1189.30 69 0.07 100
D
Carbon emissions are reduced at a rate that, if replicated
globally, would give a high probability of limiting the global
temperature increase to 2 ◦C. Electricity consumption
increases only moderately and it is fully decarbonised by 2025.
2020 408.77 9 58.94 72
2035 499.43 25 0.18 100
2050 455.23 18 0.18 100
2070 389.22 4 0.18 100
aDirect CO2 emissions are those emitted from combustion of fossil fuels to generate electricity, while indirect emissions are those emitted in
the rest of the life cycle, including extraction and processing of fuels, production and installation of power plant components, etc.
bCO2 emissions from the electricity sector in 1990 are estimated at 212.67 Mt CO2 based on 32 Mtoe reported by DECC (2014b). Conversion
factor: 1 Mtoe = 11,630 GWh.decarbonisation by 2050 (relative to 1990 emissions levels)
across the economy as a whole; this fulfils the UK’s legal
obligations with respect to climate change. It is widely
accepted that electricity is easier to decarbonise than other
sectors such as transport or heating (Ekins et al., 2013);
therefore electricity supply becomes ‘zero-carbon’ before 2050
in both scenarios, but Scenario C experiences much greater
electrification of heat and transport along with stronger
demand growth. Scenarios A and D subsequently explore
more extreme futures in which decarbonisation is very
modest and very aggressive, respectively. Scenario A is based
on UKERC’s ‘Faint-heart’ scenario (Ekins et al., 2013) and
sees emissions from electricity supply falling much more
slowly, finally reaching an 80% reduction (relative to 1990) by
2070. In contrast, scenario D assumes that electricity is fully
decarbonised in the 2020s. As a result, the scenarios cover
sufficiently different electricity futures to allow exploration
of environmental trends within a broad ‘feasibility region’.
Many other scenarios can be explored through ETLCA by
changing the assumptions on carbon emissions, electricityconsumption and technology mixes — while the specific
results will be different from those discussed here, the
environmental trends will be similar.
The following provides more detail for the main scenarios;
the sub-scenarios are described in Supplementary material
(see Appendix A).
Scenario A assumes a moderate increase (9% by 2050) in
electricity demand and relatively little effort to tackle climate
change (Azapagic et al., 2011). Carbon emissions from the
economy as a whole reduce by just 15% by 2050 on 1990 levels
and by 2070 they are reduced only by 24% (including aviation
and shipping). The majority of the emission reductions
achieved in this scenario are due to the electricity sector,
which reduces its emissions by 65% by 2050 and 80% by 2070.
However, this means that the UK misses by a large margin
its legally binding target to reduce GHG emissions from the
economy as a whole by 80% by 2050 (Climate Change Act,
2008).
In contrast, Scenario B assumes that the UK broadly
follows its current climate change commitment and does
S U S TA I N A B L E P R O D U C T I O N A N D C O N S U M P T I O N 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 – 2 1 11Fig. 5 – Summary of electricity mix for the sub-scenarios in 2050 compared to the current situation.this with an overall reduction in energy demand of 22% by
2050 and 30% by 2070 (including aviation and shipping). This,
however, requires a 90% reduction of CO2 emissions from the
electricity sector by 2035 and its complete decarbonisation
by 2050. Scenario C also considers the same CO2 emission
reductions as B but with a three-fold increase in energy
demand by 2050, assuming that the economy will be
largely electrified, including heating and transport. Currently,
electricity consumption constitutes approximately 19% of the
UK’s total energy consumption, with heat accounting for
44% and transport 37%; therefore, a transfer of demand for
heating and transport to electricity could – in the absence
of demand reduction measures – lead to a several-fold
increase in electricity generation. Scenario C reflects such a
possibility.
Scenario D is the most challenging with respect to climate
change targets as it assumes more rapid decarbonisation in
the whole economy to limit global temperature rise to 2 ◦C
or less. This requires CO2 emissions from the economy to
drop by 53% by 2020 and 90% by 2035 (including aviation and
shipping) on 1990 levels. For electricity, this means a very
rapid drop from today’s 200 Mt to just under 60 Mt by 2020
and to near zero (0.2 Mt) by 2025, allowing only a moderate
increase in demand (18% in 2050).
The scenarios and their respective sub-scenarios are de-
scribed in more detail in the Supplementary material (see Ap-
pendix A). The sub-scenarios assume different penetrations
of fossil, renewable, nuclear and CCS technologies to explore
how the carbon targets and electricity demand could be met
as specified in the scenarios. A snapshot of the electricity
mixes in all the scenarios for 2050 is given in Fig. 5 in com-
parison to the current situation; this is also discussed in more
detail in the Supplementary material (see Appendix A).
While all the scenarios consider some penetration of
renewable energy because of its availability and fast-growing
uptake, new nuclear build and CCS are considered only in
certain sub-scenarios to reflect the fact that they may not be
available for a number of reasons (including cost, technology
availability (CCS), build times and possible public opposition).
Table 4 shows which sub-scenarios include new nuclear build
and CCS.
2.3. Data quality and limitations
The main limitations and elements of uncertainty involved in
this study originate from the following:Table 4 – Summary of the assumptions for new nuclear
build and CCS for different sub-scenarios.
Sub-scenarios New nuclear build CCS
A-1, B-1, C-1, D-1 No Yes
A-2, B-2, C-2, D-2 No No
A-3, B-3, C-3, D-3 Yes Yes
A-4, B-4, C-4, D-4 Yes No
1. the background life cycle inventory (LCI) data, i.e. inputs
and outputs of materials, energy and emissions;
2. inherent uncertainty of future technological development;
and
3. exclusion of certain parts of the energy system from
the system boundary; for example, transmission network
infrastructure and energy storage requirements will differ
between scenarios but are not included.
The last point is problematic and unquantifiable for time
spans such as that considered in this study (to 2070). This
is due to a lack of knowledge of the extent to which
modern electricity gridsmight be able to accommodate future
increases in non-dispatchable generating capacity (such as
wind, solar and, to an extent, nuclear) and the extent to which
disruptive technologies might influence this via, for example,
demand side management. In short, technologies that are
outside the system boundary of this study – such as large-
scale energy storage (via pumped storage, batteries, hydrogen
production or other options) – may be needed in all of the
examined scenarios to differing degrees, but the amount, type
and impacts of these technologies are not known at present.
This area would fall under the umbrella of consequential
LCA, which attempts to account for environmental impacts
that occur in response to decisions that might be made in a
market context (Soimakallio et al., 2011). This would include
the technologies discussed above as well as, for instance,
the effects on the economy of energy price increases that
might result from increased renewable energy penetration
or fuel scarcity. Practically, this involves the integration of
LCA with economic models (Earles and Halog, 2011) and,
as yet, basic requirements such as the analysis of marginal
electricity supply have proved difficult (Ekvall and Weidema,
2004; Lund et al., 2010). Research in this area is ongoing and
examples in literature exist of future electricity analysis for
the medium term. These often involve some version of the
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model (Center for Global
Trade Analysis, 2014) such as that by Bosello et al. (2011),
Dandres et al. (2012) and Peters et al. (2011). However, this is
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of applying such an approach over such a long time scale are
not certain.
The uncertainty related to future development of tech-
nologies (point 2 above) is applicable to all studies involving
future scenarios owing to the stochastic nature of technologi-
cal development. However, there are some uncertainties spe-
cific to this work which should be noted. Firstly, much of the
LCA data for technologies in future time periods (see Table 2)
is derived from the NEEDS database (NEEDS, 2010) which ad-
dresses expected variation in future characteristics by using
three different scenarios: pessimistic, realistic-optimistic and
very optimistic. As discussed in Section 2.1, this has been
simplified in this study by using the best and worst (‘Min’
and ‘Max’) models from the selection provided by the NEEDS
database. The technology mix, as shown in Table 2, typically
assumes an even split between the best and worst outcomes,
whereas in reality either extreme might be possible.
Secondly, the future reference points of this study (2020,
2035, 2050, 2070) do not match those of the NEEDS database
(2025, 2050), therefore there is an uncertainty in their
approximation. In particular, this means that there is no
technological progression for any technologies using NEEDS
data beyond 2050: the 2050 data are used for the 2070 time
period. In reality, as discussed above, it is difficult to predict
how accurate these data will be so far into the future and
thus how important this assumption is. However, it should be
noted that the goal of this study is to address the operating
mix of power plants in each reference year and that the
operating mix changes slowly: many plants operating in 2070
will likely have been commissioned decades earlier. This
‘inertia’ in the system shouldminimise the inaccuracy arising
from the use of 2050 data for the year 2070.
Uncertainty in LCI data (point 1 above) is a problem
inherent in LCA and, in this case, cannot be assessed
statistically owing to the vast number of life cycle resource,
energy, material and emission flows occurring in the datasets
presented in Table 2. Furthermore, statistical data quality
information, such as probability distributions, is not available
with sufficient coverage to conduct a formal uncertainty
analysis. However, the background data use the Ecoinvent
database, which is one of the most rigorous LCI databases
available. The most important weakness in the data is
likely the combined use of models based on Ecoinvent v2.2
background data and models from the NEEDS database
because the latter uses Ecoinvent v1.3 background data
and therefore accounts for fewer environmental burdens.
In particular, the number of toxic substances considered
is much greater in Ecoinvent 2.2 and, as a result, human
toxicity and freshwater/marine eco-toxicity are consistently
underestimated for the technologies reliant upon NEEDS
data: namely future coal plants (with and without CCS),
future gas plants (with and without CCS), some biomass
plants, large-scale solar PV installations and marine plants
(see Table 2). However, these are still the best (and only) data
available.
In an attempt to address the robustness of the LCI data in
the study, a data quality analysis has been conducted. Each
dataset within ETLCA has been scored in each reference year
(2008, 2020, 2035, 2050 and 2070) according to four criteria:
time period specificity, geographical specificity, completeness
of inventory and quality of data source. The scoring is based
on a three-point scale where 1 is worst and 3 is best; therefore,
the minimum score is 4 (= 4 × 1) and the maximum is 12(= 4 × 3). Thus, for example, the following datasets have
lower scores: those that are based on present day technology
designs and on systems installed outside the UK, those
that have a less comprehensive list of burdens (e.g. NEEDS
database) and less robust provenance and documentation.
In the analysis, the scores assigned to each dataset in
each reference year are then multiplied by the percentage
contribution of each technology to the mix in a given year
for each sub-scenario in order to arrive at a weighted average
score for the technology mix in question. For example, if
data for solar PV score 10 out of 12 in 2050 and solar PV
contributes 15% to the 2050 electricity mix, its data quality
score is obtained by multiplying 10 by 0.15. The same is then
repeated for every other technology in the mix and the data
quality scores are added up. This yields an estimate of the
variance in data quality between sub-scenarios, in a potential
range of 4–12 for any given year, as illustrated in Fig. 6.
As shown, the data quality in this study ranges from
7.7–11.8 with the highest quality for the present-time and
lowest in future time periods. For example, the data quality in
scenario B-1 for 2008 scores 11.8 but in 2070, 8.5. However, the
decrease is not uniform across sub-scenarios. For instance,
the D sub-scenarios maintain better quality in the future (9.3
in 2050) than the A sub-scenarios (8.5–8.9 in 2050). This is
primarily due to the use of data from the NEEDS database
and, in turn, its use of Ecoinvent v1.3 background data and
generic EU geographical location (as discussed above). The
main effect of this is that the results for sub-scenarios with a
higher penetration of CCS (whose datasets all come from the
NEEDS database) – such as A-1 to A-4 – are less robust than
those relying more heavily on technology for which there are
up-to-date, UK-specific datasets such as for wind power.
In summary, the results of the data quality analysis
suggest that the data used in the study are robust, albeit more
so for scenarios B, C and D than for A.
3. Results and discussion
The environmental impacts for the different scenarios,
estimated using the ETLCA model, are discussed below.
Owing to space restriction, only the graphs for selective
impacts are shown; the graphs for the remaining impacts as
well as the full results for all the 12 impacts and 16 scenarios
can be found in the Supplementary material (see Appendix
A). For the environmental impacts of individual technologies,
see Kouloumpis et al. (2012).
3.1. Global warming potential (GWP)
As expected and shown in Fig. 7, the scenarios with lower
direct carbon emissions, and particularly the ones in which
decarbonisation happens earlier (D-1 to D-4), all have much
lower GWP than today. Even in the least ambitious sub-
scenarios (A-1 to A-4), the GWP is reduced by 71%–81% by
2070, with all other scenarios achieving reductions above 85%
compared to today’s impact. In the best case (D-3), by 2070
the electricity supply has a GWP of 8.25 Mt CO2-eq./yr, or 21 g
CO2-eq./kWh, compared to the current 197 Mt CO2-eq./yr or
530 g/kWh. In theworst case (A-2), life cycle emissions decline
to 56.5 Mt CO2-eq./yr, or 124 g CO2-eq./kWh but, as discussed
in Section 2.2, this is not enough for the UK to reach its carbon
reduction targets.
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differences in data quality between sub-scenarios is accentuated because of the shortening of the y-axis to show only the
range of scores obtained in the analysis (7–12).].Fig. 7 – Global warming potentials for all sub-scenarios.Despite the B and C scenarios having the same 2050
carbon reduction target, the latter have noticeably higher
GWP, particularly in the period 2020–2050. This is due to their
much higher electricity demand and the resulting pressure
to construct low-carbon capacity at extremely high rates.
This is particularly problematic if nuclear and/or CCS do
not go ahead: for instance, in C-2 (which lacks new nuclear
and CCS), around 180 GW of solar PV must be installed
between 2020 and 2035. This is equivalent to around 60
million residential-sized installations (at typical current sizes)
— for context, in 2013 there were 26.4 million residencies
in the UK (ONS, 2013). It can also be noticed from Fig. 7
that the GWP remains constant in all the C sub-scenarios
after 2050: for C-1 and C-2 this is due to a slightly increased
amount of electricity from offshore relative to onshore wind,
with the former having a higher GWP per unit electricity
generated (Kouloumpis et al., 2012); for C-3 and C-4 the
increase is because of a reduced penetration of nuclear power(from 26% to 24%) as some plants come to the end of their
lifetime, which is compensated by an increase in solar PV
and marine energy, both of which have higher GWP than
nuclear. Thus, the overall policy implications from the climate
change perspective are that new nuclear and/or CCS build
should go ahead and that energy demand reduction should
be prioritised.
3.2. Abiotic resource depletion potential: elements (ADPe)
As indicated in Fig. 8, depletion of elements increases in all
sub-scenarios relative to the present, but the impact varies
by a factor of 53 depending on the scenario, ranging from
44–2315 t Sb-eq./yr in 2070. In the A scenarios there is a
continued reliance on fossil fuels either with or without
CCS (these technologies still provide 41%–65% of the mix
by 2050) and fossil options tend to have lower ADPe than
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increases by 3–5 times. In contrast, the C scenarios involve
much more aggressive decarbonisation coupled with a high
electricity demand; consequently, much greater capacities of
wind and solar PV are required. The use of metals during their
construction results in annual ADPe up to 145 times higher in
2070 than at the present; specifically, about 90% of this impact
comes from the solar PV life cycle with tellurium and silver
accounting for∼70%. The restrictive carbon targets alsomean
that CCS cannot be used later in the period, leaving nuclear
as the major low-ADPe option. Therefore, ADPe is 25% lower
in the C scenarios with nuclear power (C-3 and C-4) than in
those without.
Notably, the scenarios with the lowest carbon emissions
(D) cause considerably less ADPe than the B or C scenarios
(see Fig. 8). This is because solar PV does not feature
strongly in the D scenarios (because of the earlier mentioned
assumption that end-user subsidies focus on demand
reduction rather than on the FITs). Without solar PV, most
demand is met by nuclear, wind and biomass, none of which
causes as much element depletion as PV (for details, see
Kouloumpis et al. (2012)). However, even in these scenarios
the ADPe is higher in 2070 than today.
Overall, the best sub-scenario for this impact is A-4,
depleting 44 t Sb-eq./yr in 2070, but in this scenario the
carbon targets are not achieved. The best scenario which does
achieve the carbon targets is D-3, but at the expense of a four
times higher depletion of elements than today. Thus, there is
a significant trade-off betweenmitigating climate change and
depletion of non-renewable resources — both impacts have
intergenerational implications because of their long-term
impacts so that solutions should be sought that minimise
both. It should be stressed that this is not a conclusion that
could be derived or quantified without a life cycle approach.
3.3. Abiotic resource depletion potential: fossil fuels (ADPf)
Depletion of fossil fuels broadly reduces in line with carbon
emissions, thus the overall annual depletion impact by
2070 is universally lower than today (see Figure S1 in the
Supplementary material (Appendix A)). However, the use of
CCS in A-1 (providing 60% of electricity) means that ADPf
reduces by only 7% relative to the present. Similarly, the boomin CCS stimulated by high electricity demand in C-1 and C-3
between 2020 and 2050 produces a peak in ADPf in 2035. In
the worst case (C-1 in 2035), ADPf is equivalent to 4064 PJ per
year, or 73% higher than today. This not only depletes fossil
resources for future generations but also has implications for
energy security because of the increased reliance on imported
fossil fuels.
3.4. Acidification potential (AP)
As shown in Figure S2 in the Supplementary material (see
Appendix A), all sub-scenarios follow a downward trend for
the AP, declining from today’s value of 348 kt SO2-eq./yr (0.94
g SO2-eq./kWh) to between 83 and 277 kt SO2-eq./yr (0.17–0.51
g SO2-eq./kWh) by 2070. Within each scenario, the fourth sub-
scenario (4) has the lowest AP because of the exclusion of CCS
and considerable contribution from nuclear (which has one of
the lowest APs of all the technologies considered). Coal CCS
and biomass are the worst options for this impact owing to
their relatively high acid emissions to air; for this reason, A-1
is one of the worst options with 232 kt SO2-eq./yr as these two
technologies contribute 38% of the mix in 2070. Nevertheless,
the C scenarios still have the highest annual impact (241–277
kt SO2-eq./yr) because of their high electricity demand. Sub-
scenario C-1 is the worst option in the mid-period (2035)
when the AP peaks, exceeding today’s value by around 10%
(see Figure S2). By the end of the period, C-2 has the highest
impact of 277 kt SO2-eq./yr. However, at 0.20–0.23 g SO2-eq.
per kWh in 2070, the impact of the C scenarios per unit
generated is lower than any other scenario, except for B-1
and B-2; thus, if its electricity demand was equivalent to that
in the other scenarios, C would be the best option for this
impact, indicating again the importance of reducing energy
consumption. It is also interesting to note that the AP for
scenarios D is comparable to that of A — this is largely due
to the biomass which is a significant contribution to the mix
in these scenarios and has the highest AP of the technologies
considered (for details, see Kouloumpis et al. (2012)).
3.5. Eutrophication potential (EP)
Eutrophication decreases in all sub-scenarios (Figure S3),
primarily because of retirement of conventional coal plants.
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the highest EP (Kouloumpis et al., 2012); therefore C-2 has
the highest overall impact owing to its installed capacities of
22 GW of biomass and around 435 GW of solar PV in 2070.
Even in this case, the impact per kWh decreases from 0.65
to 0.13 g PO3−4 -eq./kWh between now and 2070, with most
of the reduction being counteracted by increased demand.
The best sub-scenario in terms of EP is A-4 because of a
strong contribution from nuclear (40% from 2050 onward) and
lower carbon constraints allowing continued use of natural
gas, which has relatively low EP. Thus, in A-4, the impact
decreases from 242 kt PO3−4 -eq./yr today to 41.8 kt by 2070
(0.092 g PO3−4 -eq./kWh). The next best option, the low-carbon
B-4, has an 8% higher EP at the end of the period; however, it
is still five times lower than the current impact.
3.6. Freshwater aquatic eco-toxicity potential (FAETP)
Freshwater eco-toxicity is less affected by technology mix
than most of the other impacts, other than benefitting from
the retirement of conventional coal plants. Consequently,
the results of the scenario analysis tend to correlate with
electricity demand more than with choice of technology:
the overall FAETP in 2070 ranges from 7.1 to 11.1 Mt
dichlorobenzene (DCB)-eq./yr for all the scenarios except for
the C scenarios which generate 24.7–25.6 Mt DCB-eq./yr. At
the end of the period, the best scenario is A-4; however, the
carbon targets are not achieved. The best low-carbon scenario
is D-1, with 9.1 Mt DCB-eq./yr, or 20% higher than the best
option, but nevertheless four times lower than today’s value.
Per unit electricity, all sub-scenarios see a reduction from
the current 100 g DCB-eq./kWh to 15–24 g by 2070 (see Tables
S2, S4, S6 & S8 in the Supplementary material (Appendix A)).
3.7. Human toxicity potential (HTP)
As shown in Fig. 9, all sub-scenarios see a drop in HTP
between the present and 2020 as old coal plants retire.
However, from 2020 onward, the impact increases again to
varying extents, with the sub-scenarios relying on nuclear
power (labelled as -3 and -4) having a higher impact than
those without nuclear. This is due to long-term emissions ofheavy metals from uranium mill tailings in countries from
which uranium is sourced.
However, as demonstrated by scenarios A, B and D, it
is possible to increase nuclear generation significantly and
still maintain an overall HTP similar to, or lower than, that
of today. Scenario C is the exception because of its high
electricity demand, stimulating up to 38 GW of new nuclear
capacity (approximately four times that of the present day),
in turn resulting in the HTP of 77 Mt DCB-eq./yr. Per kilowatt-
hour this is, in fact, lower than the current impact (64 g c.f.
100 g DCB-eq./kWh), but the improvement is negated by
a failure to improve end-user energy efficiency in the C
scenario.
Overall, the best sub-scenarios for the HTP in 2070 are A-
2, D-1 and D-2, emitting 13.1–13.5 Mt DCB-eq./yr — all three
exclude nuclear power but A-2 misses the carbon targets
while D-1 and D-2 achieve the early decarbonisation needed
to stabilise the global temperature rise to 2 ◦C. Therefore,
these results would suggest that an electricity mix dominated
by renewables (biomass, wind andmarine) would be preferred
over that relying on nuclear power as that would meet the
very ambitious carbon targets while minimising the human
toxicity potential from electricity generation.
3.8. Marine aquatic eco-toxicity potential (MAETP)
Nearly 95% of the MAETP from current electricity generation
is due to coal power (primarily from emission to air of
hydrogen fluoride during coal combustion and beryllium to
water during mining). As a result, elimination of conventional
coal from the mix reduces the current MAETP from
146 Gt DCB-eq./yr (391 kg/kWh) to 11–57 Gt/yr by 2070
(27–122 kg/kWh). The best options for the MAETP are the D
scenarios: they are the only ones for which this impact is
consistently below 20 Gt/yr for the entire 2020–2070 period
(Figure S5). This is due primarily to the absence of coal
CCS in the D scenarios as a result of very early, aggressive
decarbonisation. In later time periods, solar PV tends to
dominate the MAETP in all the D scenarios because of
high installed capacities and emissions of metals to water
and hydrogen fluoride to air (both associated with metal
processing during component manufacture).
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All scenarios see an increase in the ODP in the short
term owing to increased reliance on natural gas and
the subsequent increased leakage of halons during gas
distribution and its associated supply chain. However, as
shown in Fig. 10, after 2020 there is considerable variation
between the scenarios. All the A scenarios stay above the
current ODP value of 3.54 t CFC-11-eq./yr throughout the time
period because of a reliance on gas (with or without CCS).
Scenarios B and D both have a similar ODP which reduces
to below 2 t CFC-11-eq./yr by 2050. This reduction is brought
about by a greater penetration of renewables and nuclear
power. Sub-scenarios C-1 to C-4 cause similar impacts per
kWh to B-1 to B-4, peaking at around 32 µg CFC-11-eq./kWh
in 2020 and declining thereafter (see Tables S2, S4, S6 & S6
in the Supplementary material (Appendix A)), but the high
electricity demand in the C scenarios increases annual ODP
significantly: in 2035, C-1 has a 5.5 times higher impact than
today.
3.10. Photochemical oxidant creation potential (POCP)
Also known as photochemical smog, this impact is lowest
in B-4 over the entire time period, owing to its sizeable
contribution from nuclear and wind power which have the
lowest POCP of all the technologies considered (Kouloumpis
et al., 2012). By 2035, POCP decreases from 28 kt C2H4-eq./yr
(76 mg C2H4-eq./kWh) to 10 kt/yr (27 mg/kWh) and stays
steady around this level until 2070 (Table S6). In all cases, the
sub-scenarios that lack nuclear power have the worst POCP
because they are forced to rely more heavily on CCS, biomass
and/or solar, none of which has as low an impact as nuclear
or wind. As for most other impacts, scenario C is the worst
option, with the POCP peaking in 2035 at 48.8 kt (for C-1), 40%
higher than today. As before, this is mainly due to the high
electricity demand. After that, the impact gradually reduces
to levels slightly above the current value.
3.11. Terrestrial eco-toxicity potential (TETP)
The best scenarios for this impact are A-2 and D-1 with
around 228 kt DCB-eq./yr in 2070 (see Figure S7). Thisrepresents a reduction of around 30% compared to the current
TETP. In both cases, the reductions are due to the initial
phasing out of coal power and a lack of coal CCS.
As is the case for most other impacts, the C sub-scenarios
are the worst overall owing to their high electricity demand:
while TETP per kWh is similar to that of the other scenarios,
higher demand results in a 2.3-fold increase over today’s
levels on an annual basis.
3.12. Health impact potential from radiation (RAD)
As indicated in Fig. 11, there is clear divergence in future RAD
impact between sub-scenarios with and without new nuclear
build. In the best case (D-1) the annual impact declines from
today’s 1300 disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) per year
to 28 DALYs/yr by 2070 owing to a lack of nuclear power
and the low overall electricity demand that results from
aggressive energy-efficiency measures. In the worst cases
(C-3 and C-4) the impact rises to 5900 DALYs/yr, to which
nuclear power contributes 98%. In this case, around 38 GW
of nuclear capacity is installed; however, the majority of the
impact is from very long term (thousands of years) emissions
of radon from uranium milling facilities rather than from the
plants themselves.
3.13. Summary comparison of scenarios
The results for each sub-scenario are summarised on a ‘heat
map’ in Fig. 12 by normalising the annual impacts in the
baseline year (2008) to 100, allowing each environmental
impact in subsequent years for every sub-scenario to be
expressed relative to the baseline. Therefore, lighter shades in
the figure represent an improvement over 2008, while darker
shades represent an increased environmental impact.
As can be seen from the figure, the A sub-scenarios
are typically characterised by the fastest and greatest
reduction in EP, FAETP and HTP, but do not meet the carbon
targets. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the
results of the A sub-scenarios are the least robust because
of the less comprehensive list of burdens considered in
NEEDS, as discussed in Section 2.3 (see Fig. 6), therefore
the aforementioned reduction in certain impacts may be
overestimated. The D sub-scenarios tend to have the lowest
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C sub-scenarios are the worst options overall throughout the
time period. B-1 to B-4 successfully reach the carbon targets
with impacts that are generally lower than their A and C
alternatives while requiring a less extreme energy mix than
D-1 to D-4.
It is also useful to compare the impacts of individual
technologies to gain insight into their effect on the impacts in
different scenarios and identify possiblemitigation strategies.
Fig. 13 shows the ‘heat map’ for the impacts of each
technology in the year 2050. As can be seen, hydropower
and onshore wind have the lowest impacts overall, while oil
and coal CCS have the highest. Since the share of oil in the
electricity mix is already decreasing and will be phased out in
the future, this leaves coal CCS as the worst overall performer.
As a result, coal CCS tends to make a major contribution to
the overall medium-term environmental impacts in all future
scenarios in which it features (although beyond 2035 it is a
minor component of the mix due to its relatively high global
warming potential). In scenarios without coal CCS (those
ending in ‘−2’ and ‘−4’), impacts tend to be dominated by
biomass and solar PV.
It is of note that offshore wind, solar power and marine
are the worst options in terms of depletion of elements
owing to their high metal consumption per unit output.
This emphasises the need to ensure end-of-life recycling to
recover as much material as possible, and to improve design
by using less scarce materials and through ‘lightweighting’.
Biomass – another prominent low-carbon option – performs
badly in terms of AP, EP, FAETP and POCP. Some of this can be
attributed to the transportation of biomass (POCP), the use of
fertilisers and treatment of waste streams with a high organic
content (EP) and emissions from power plants (NOx and SOx
in the case of AP; heavy metal emissions from combustion in
the case of FAETP). Therefore these impacts might be reduced
by measures such as (a) ensuring that energy crops are high
yielding and fertiliser-free where possible (e.g. miscanthus)
and (b) implementing pollution control measures such as
those used for coal power plants to minimise emissions of
SOx, NOx and heavy metals.4. Conclusions
This paper has presented an application of a novel model
combining a life cycle approach with scenario analysis to
explore what implications the anticipated decarbonisation of
electricity supply may have for other environmental impacts.
For these purposes, 12 life cycle environmental impacts have
been estimated for 16 electricity scenarios up to 2070, to
identify any trade-offs between mitigation of climate change
and other impacts. The UK has been used as an illustrative
example to demonstrate the scale of transformation needed
and the resulting impacts on the environment as a whole. The
main conclusions are as follows:
• As demonstrated by scenario A, unprecedented deploy-
ment of low-carbon technologies (up to 40 GW of CCS ca-
pacity, 24 GW nuclear, 65 GW wind, 19 GW biomass) may
still be insufficient to meet carbon targets and limit global
average temperature rise to 2 ◦C if any significant conven-
tional fossil-fuelled capacity is retained beyond 2035 (with-
out CCS). The sub-scenarios in which the least decarboni-
sation is attempted also have the worst depletion of fossil
fuels and, beyond 2035, ozone layer depletion.
• While conventional coal power must be phased out by the
mid-2020s to meet carbon targets, natural gas (without
CCS) may persist for longer at a reduced contribution –
typically less than 14% of themix by 2035 – but deployment
of low-carbon options must be pursued rapidly.
• When demand reduction is not prioritised alongside
decarbonisation (as in scenario C) several impacts increase
by 2070: annual depletion of elements (by 110–145 times),
human toxicity (by 1.5–2 times) and terrestrial eco-toxicity
(by 2.3 times). Additionally, depletion of fossil fuels, ozone
layer depletion and photochemical smog all increase
between 2020 and 2050 (owing to extensive use of gas CCS,
coal CCS and biomass) before falling back to lower levels
by 2070.
• Another consequence of high demand is extremely high
installed capacities including up to 160 GW of wind
capacity by 2070, 440 GW of solar PV, 38 GW of nuclear and
60 GW of biomass and marine. These capacities eclipse
the entire current UK generating fleet of ∼90 GW and may
not be feasible or socially acceptable. In short, if demand
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dark red the highest environmental impact. Direct CO2: direct emissions of CO2 from power plants, GWP: global warming
potential, ADPe: abiotic depletion potential of elements, ADPf: abiotic depletion potential of fossil fuels, AP: acidification
potential, EP: eutrophication potential, FAETP: freshwater aquatic eco-toxicity potential, HTP: human toxicity potential,
MAETP: marine aquatic eco-toxicity potential, ODP: ozone layer depletion potential, POCP: photochemical oxidants creation
potential, TETP: terrestrial eco-toxicity potential, RAD: health impacts from radiation.].rises considerably it is difficult to meet carbon targets
and impossible to avoid increases in other environmental
impacts.
• Decarbonisation is likely to increase depletion of elements:
in the carbon target-compliant scenarios examined, ADPe
in 2070 is 4–145 times higher than in the present.
Therefore, end-of-life recycling and a circular economy
are important and must be pursued alongside carbon
reduction.
• It is possible to decarbonise while simultaneously
reducing other life cycle environmental impacts (apart
from depletion of elements) by following one of thescenario B options and avoiding CCS deployment. Sub-
scenario B-4 requires 29 GW of new nuclear build by 2050,
36 GW of wind, 136 GW of solar PV and 16 GW of biomass
and marine. In fact, by making use of nuclear power, B-4
has lower global warming potential than some of the more
aggressive scenarios (D-1 and D-2).
• The lowest overall impacts are achieved in scenario D, but
this requires deployment of renewables at a magnitude
(e.g., 75 GW of wind by 2035) that raises questions
surrounding technical ability tomatch supply and demand
owing to the intermittency issues. Moreover, the climate
change benefits are negligible compared to scenario B.
S U S TA I N A B L E P R O D U C T I O N A N D C O N S U M P T I O N 1 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 – 2 1 19Fig. 13 – ‘Heat map’ of the environmental impacts of individual technologies in 2050. [White signifies the lowest and dark
red the highest environmental impact. For impacts nomenclature, see Fig. 12.].• With respect to the individual technologies, those with
the lowest impacts overall are hydro and onshore wind.
However, the potential for the future expansion of the
former is limited and the latter is constrained by land
availability as well as opposition by the public. Marine,
nuclear and gas power are the next best options, assuming
all the impacts are of equal importance. If, on the other
hand, climate change is considered a priority for the
UK, then deployment of low-carbon technologies such as
marine, nuclear, wind and solar PV should be pursued.
Coal CCS should be avoided as it has high impacts across
all the categories, including greenhouse gas emissions.
In summary, the results from this work suggest that
decarbonisation of electricity supply to meet the 2050 carbon
targets would lead to a reduction in the majority of the life
cycle impacts by 2070. There are two exceptions to this. First
is depletion of elements which would increase by 4–145 times
on today’s value. The second exception is health impact from
radiation which would increase four-fold if nuclear power is
used and electricity demand grows strongly; even if growth in
demand is reduced, it would still rise two-fold. Furthermore,
ozone layer depletion would also increase beyond the current
value in the short-term (2020) across all the scenarios, by
between 2.5–3.7 times. The results also reveal that, if energy
demand continued to grow (as in C), three other impacts
would also increase over their current values by 2070 while
trying to meet the carbon targets: human toxicity (up to
two times), photochemical smog (by 12%) and terrestrial eco-
toxicity (2.3 times). These findings illustrate yet again the
importance of prioritising measures for demand reduction to
avoid meeting climate change targets at the expense of other
environmental impacts.
The problems associated with high demand also have
serious repercussions for the oft-recurring suggestion to
electrify heating and transport, which would inevitably lead
to a great increase in electricity demand. The whole-system
effects of such a shift need to be considered and, therefore,
future work would need to compare a complete provision
of services under different paradigms: i.e. the entire current
system (electricity, heating and transport) must be compared
to a fully electrified system in order to investigate the trade-
offs fairly. There may be benefits, for instance, in reduced
urban air pollution owing to electrified transport; conversely,
the use of electricity for heating is likely to result in much
higher system-wide depletion of resources than the current
gas-dominated heating system. These and other complex
causal sequences should be taken into account.
Similarly, infrastructure and energy storage are examples
of other system-level parameters requiring consideration.Scenarios with higher penetration of inflexible technologies
such as wind, PV and nuclear will require energy storage
technologies and this will increase the impacts of the system
as a whole. Scenarios that will be most affected by this
include B-3, B-4 and all the C scenarios. As discussed in
Section 2.3, this is beyond the remit of this paper and requires
further study.
The results also beg the question of how important each
impact is in absolute terms: for instance, would a doubling
of terrestrial eco-toxicity breach some ecological limit or is it
of little importance? This could be quantified by normalising
the results to the world or regional impacts. However, this
is problematic because of the many assumptions that would
be required for normalisation of impacts so far out in the
future when it is not known what they will be either globally
or regionally. Further work in this area may prove useful
to fully contextualise findings from this and other similar
studies.
Future work should also include the economic and social
implications of the scenarios as well as development of
more robust LCA databases for future energy technologies.
Moreover, further research is needed into the ability of
electricity grid systems to incorporate less dispatchable
generation capacity (such as wind, solar and nuclear)
simultaneously. The latter is critical to ensuring that impacts
are captured at the systems level, commensurate with the
systems approach that is so fundamental to LCA.
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